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The Blue Nile Conflict: Muddy Grounds

The bloodline of East Africa, the Nile, is becoming a muddy ground for conflict, one that could take decades to run dry.

By Shorouk El Hariry

It came as no surprise when he refused to speak to me over the phone. ‘Hamdy Al-Anany’ – a name that topped the headlines of several African newspapers in the past two weeks – is the Middle East North Africa agency country reporter in Ethiopia. What he had experienced on that night of May 24th in Addis Ababa was nothing he had expected when he was granted permission to visit the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Detained and held in captivity in a 4X4 cell with 25 criminals, Al-Anany was later deported to Egypt, an incident about which the Egyptian Foreign Ministry expressed “deep regrets”, demanding an explanation from its Ethiopian counterpart. While no official clarification was given as to why that happened, a report by Ethiopian publication Horn Affairs stated that he “was expelled from Ethiopia because of his involvement in activities that are contrary to the objectives of the profession that he was accredited for”.

This is by no means the first tension-causing incident to spark between Egypt and Ethiopia. In fact, the relations have been rather strained since April 2011, when Ethiopia decided to construct its first mega-dam project, GERD.

Introducing GERD: Renaissance and Conflict

Al-Anany was only visiting the new dam, since it had ignited his journalistic interest. Located on the Blue Nile, one of two main tributaries of the Nile, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is being built five miles from the Ethiopian border with Sudan, around 1.000 km from the capital Addis Ababa.

According to a recently leaked report issued by the International Panel of Experts on the dam, the project is the biggest ever in Ethiopia, and is expected to have a reservoir holding 67 billion cubic meters of water, potentially generating 6.000 megawatts of electric power, enough to power a developed-world city like NYC.

The benefits of the project are myriad. Not only will Ethiopia be fed with a renewable source of electricity, but it is planning to supply other power-hungry countries as well. In a Reuters report published in April, it is said that Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania are to reap the benefits by buying hundreds of Ethiopian megawatts.

As the Nile flows from the south to the north, these countries are upstream; but what about downstream countries?

Egypt has obviously been no big fan of the GERD. It has been particularly concerned about the share of water it will lose during the five to 10 year period it will take for the reservoir’s dam to fill. In a televised statement by former Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi, he expressed concerns towards to what extent Egyptian hydroelectric turbines in Aswan, where the High Dam is, will be able to operate.

Nearly a third of the electricity generated by the High Dam could be lost, according to a Common Dreams news report. Ministry of Irrigation officials claim Egypt will lose 20 to 30 percent of its water share. Bearing in mind that Egyptian per capita water share is around 660 cubic meters, among the world’s lowest, and that the population is expected to double by 2065, the GERD could tighten Egyptian water resources incredibly.

Between espionage and political conflict

Ethiopia has already begun diverting the river for construction purposes. Although it has significantly stressed the fact that the dam is being built for hydroelectric purposes rather than irrigation, Egyptian politicians and authorities have been agitated. Some have gone as far as considering these actions as a “declaration of war by Ethiopia on Egypt.”

In a telephone interview with Prof. ElSayed Ali Fleifel, former Dean of the Institute of African Research and Studies, he said, “Ethiopia had always had these plans of constructing a dam, and it’s quite a shame they took advantage of the situation and made their decision at such a critical time of Egyptian history,” referring to internal political conflict in post-revolution Egypt.

The Ethiopian half of the equation is not the only one accused of malice. In fact, the aforementioned Hamdy Al-Anany was allegedly accused of espionage, according to a Horn Affairs report by Daniel Berhane. Reaching out to him for further explanation, he replied: “Egypt is believed to have been engaged in a series of activities since the launch of the GERD project. Such activities, often attributed to Egyptian elements, range from anonymous disinformation campaigns – which seldom surface in the media – to ‘diplomatic activities’ in the region, all which are believed to be a sort of psychological warfare to test and/or weaken the resolve and confidence of Ethiopians in their government.”

State-owned MENA agency director, Alaa Heidar, attributed the Ethiopian government’s reaction to Al- Anany visiting the dam twice, knowing the very long distance he needed to travel from Addis Ababa to reach it. “This is a direct message from Ethiopia to Egypt”, he said, adding, “Al-Anany is a simple man whose work in Ethiopia is highly appreciated; his involvement in espionage is highly unlikely.”

Berhane also believes that Egypt, either directly or via its close ally, Eritrea, maintains links to various domestic subversive groups. His beliefs are primarily backed up by the year-old statements made by various Egyptian politicians in a round-table conference, in which they discussed potential solutions to the

problem.

Scandalous Statements

The round-table conference was not meant to be televised on-air. However, that’s a fact nobody in the room was aware of, resulting in a state of unreserved speaking of mind. One politician, Ayman Nour, 65 advised Morsi to start reviewing scenarios to deal with the crisis, including pressures inside Ethiopia and Ethiopian Islamic neighboring countries, such as Eritrea and Somalia, who don’t share a good relationship with Ethiopia, in hopes of creating a greater opposition towards the dam.

Other politicians proposed a bombing of the dam in defense of Egypt’s right in the Nile water. While that sounds far-fetched, a Wiki-Leaks document confirms such plans, as it was disclosed that Egypt was considering establishing an airbase in Sudan, tasked with destroying the Ethiopian dam if all negotiation fails.

However, Sudan is no longer in line with Egyptian hostility. Though a downstream country, Sudan is convinced that the dam would bring more benefit than harm, since it could be supplied with electrical power. It was reported that the President of South Sudan asserted that the recently signed strategic cooperation treaties between Egypt and South Sudan would not allow the initiation of a military attack from Sudanese lands, calling upon Egypt to stop provocations of a “water war” in the Nile Basin nations.

An African Glare

Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia are all part of the African Union. Normally, the AU would take a clearly objective position in attempt to manage the crisis. However, Egypt’s position is frowned upon.

Due to political instability in Egypt that resulted from the overthrow of President Muhammad Morsi, Egyptian-African relations have tensed, resulting in the suspension of Egypt’s membership in the Union until constitutional rule and democracy are restored in the country.

Foreign Affairs Minister Nabil Fahmy was not pleased. Hoping to bolster relations, he sent a delegation to the AU’s Panel of the Wise to try and convince them to change their stance on Egyptian membership. The visit did not yield much benefit, as they saw that it was not in Africa’s interest for the vote to be taken at the time, according to Admore Kambudzi, secretary of the council.

Currently, the Nile Basin conflict is on the Union’s agenda. After military threats surfaced that pointed at the media as an element of the conflict, Ugandan President Yoweri Musevini, a key player in South Sudan politics, made a rather strong statement against Egypt in his budgetary speech to his parliament. It was published on the Ugandan Statehouse website: “It is advisable that those chauvinistic statements coming out of Egypt are restrained, and through the Nile Valley Organization, rational – not emotional and uninformed statements – discussions take place. No African wants to hurt Egypt; however, Egypt cannot continue to hurt black Africa and the countries of the tropics of Africa.”

In the Eyes of International Law: who owns the Nile?

Since hostility remains the general ambiance within the only intergovernmental organization in the region that has the power to peacefully resolve the conflict, it is important to examine the matter at hand in the eyes of international law.

No existing treaty or agreement could be utilized to resolve the conflict, as both Egypt and Ethiopia are resorting to two conflicting agreements to support their standpoint. Regarding the Efficacy of Water Treaties in the Eastern Nile Basin, Wuhibegezer Ferede and Sheferawu Abebe state that the reason for the conflict is outlined in the different approaches both countries use: while upstream countries favour clean slate policy, downstream ones seem to favour colonial treaties.

On one hand, Egypt’s main argument is based on its historical inherent right to use the Nile waters. Based on a colonial-era agreement that was signed in 1929, Egypt and Sudan have the rights to 55,5 billion and 18,5 billion cubic meters of water respectively. That is to say that colonialism supported downstream countries’ rights in the Nile, ignoring the needs of upstream countries that stretch along the 6,700 km long basin.

On the other hand, a 2010 framework convention, also known as the Entebbe Agreement, was signed by six upstream countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi, aiming at increasing their use of the Nile because of their frustration over seeking permission from Egypt to perform economic and hydro-projects over the Nile.

That agreement was not signed by Egypt or Sudan, rejecting it as a form of violation to their historical rights to utilize the Nile in order to satisfy their agricultural, drinking and electricity-generating purposes.

Further Accusation: Proxy War

“Egypt does not seek harm towards any African country,” said Alaa Heidar. “Hopefully, now that we have a new president, Egypt will soon commence its African Union activities on the basis of mutual respect. After all, MENA needs its Ethiopian office, with Addis Ababa being the headquarters of the Union.”

“All we need is a well-studied report of how the dam will affect Egyptian waters, and we do not need spies for that,” he continued, referring to Al-Anany’s case.

Heidar is not the only one demanding exact numbers of the impact. Ideally, such a grand project should have accurate scientific reports, something the International Panel of Experts sought. The 10-member panel included six national experts – two each from Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, as well as four international experts. Its 800+ page report was submitted to each country on May 2013, and later leaked on the Internet.

International Rivers, a global NGO concerned with the global struggle for river water, reviewed the Panel’s report, and came up with an analysis that forced it to get caught in the crossfire between Ethiopia and Egypt.

“International Rivers made a gross misinterpretation of the report, either by accident or by design,” wrote Daniel Berhane in Horn Affairs. It was claimed that IR is campaigning against the economic renaissance of Ethiopia, accusing it of fighting a proxy war for Egypt.

“Again, the IR never loses the opportunity to lobby for its Egyptian paymasters,” the author wrote, a direct and strong accusation of bribery. However, International Rivers denied such bribery in a letter it wrote back to Horn Affairs. It based its argument on the numerous problems with existing analysis and a lack of examination of critical issues, including the hydrological impact, downstream countries’ water supplies and power generation, climate change risks, and geotechnical issues.

Furthermore, IR’s report mentioned an important fact: Ethiopia’s options for economic development are very limited. With nearly 90 million people, it is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking as 174 amongst 187 countries on the UNDP 2013 index, based on education, life expectancy, average income per person, and other factors.

The multibillion dam is likely to significantly harm the Ethiopian economy and its citizens’ lives, by draining all financial resources to complete the project, according to the IMF. It also states that it’s likely to absorb 10 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP, thus displacing any other infrastructure progress.

Reaching Common Grounds for Common Waters

“We understand Ethiopia’s need for development,” says Alaa Heidar, “but not on the shoulders of Egyptians’ drinking water, their lifeline. I expect that Egypt-African relations will go back to pre-revolution era, in Abdul Fattah Al Sisi’s reign. After all, he is a military man, and his main concern will be restoring Egyptian national security.”

The dangers of failing to resolve the conflict are countless. Most importantly, Arab League countries continue to support the Egyptian standpoint, building a Pan-African versus Pan-Arab dimension. Hence, in case a water conflict erupts, it is very likely to bleed on the rest of the Arab-African countries, tightening the tension amongst all.

Hoping that a potential water war is not looming, Heidar asserts that Ethiopia should do all it can to comfort Egyptian authorities, with diplomatic and cultural dialogue replacing military talks. “A joint commission that could oversee the temporary and long-term impacts of the dam should be formed,” he added.

In turn, Egypt ought to understand that it may not have absolute monopoly over the Nile based on colonial-era agreements. The claim of status quo as a standard for reasonable use has been explicitly rejected in the 1997 UN Convention. Thus, it is necessary that Egypt recognize upstream countries’ rights to reasonably use the Nile waters as its sole contributors.

Unfortunately, water conflicts tend to be irrationally destructive, on political, social and economic levels. In an era where global liberal politics seem to be the dominant ideology, transboundary water conflicts will never be resolved through espionage accusations, ultra-nationalism, or military threats.

Shorouk el Hairy can be found on Twitter at: http://twitter.com/shoroukelhariry

Photo credited to Asian International Rivers Centre.

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