What kind of peace?
The role of the West in Macedonia's post-2001 troublesome ethnic reconciliation
by Ivo Bosilkov
Wounds reopened
When Talat Xhaferi was inaugurated as Minister of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia in February 2013, his statement on the official government website said that his goal is for the armed forces to become “a symbol of coexistence, tolerance and respect for the differences”. An expected cliché, and often used in the context of Macedonia's post-2001 inter-ethnic conflict discourse. What was not expected and instead shocked and enraged the Macedonian population was the status change on his party's Facebook page: “UCK is now in command of the Army.”
In 2001, UCK (or NLA, as in the National Liberation Army) was an Albanian paramilitary formation that fought an armed conflict against the Macedonian army. Xhaferi had a high position in the command chain of the rebels, whose insurgency claimed the lives of 75 members of the Macedonian security forces. After the conflict ended, the UCK and Xhaferi changed their military uniforms with suits and ties, as the organization transformed into a political party of the Albanian minority, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). His promotion to the rank of Defence minister, after being a high-ranking officer in the enemy's lines, was interpreted by the Macedonian population as treason and humiliation; a reopening of wounds that even after almost a decade and a half, can't seem to heal.
The Xhaferi controversy has been only one more detail in a series of incidents with ethnic undertones that have exposed the frailties of a Macedonian society that never fully dealt with the fallout of the 2001 conflict. When the West brokered peace through its diplomatic efforts, and enforced the Ohrid framework agreement as a foundation to future Macedonian-Albanian relations within the country, it seemed like a success story. Yet, this treaty is a source of discontent for both ethnic groups nowadays. Albanians feel it hasn't been entirely implemented, meaning they still don't enjoy the same rights as the Macedonian majority, while the Macedonians themselves are even more skeptical towards it, considering it a painful reminder of being forced to compromise with the 'terrorists' who threatened the country's territorial integrity and put it on the brink of civil war. And while the West achieved its primary objective – to stop the potential escalation of a controlled armed conflict to full scale war, somewhat easing its 'conscience' after failing to prevent the same in the other cases of former Yugoslavia throughout the 90s, it hasn't managed to follow up on it and get to grips with its aftermath. The result of which is perpetual ethnic tension, sporadic but frequent violence, and in general, a very suspect reconciliation.
Nationalist discourse and street violence
The logic of the West was clear: we helped you avoid the horrors of civil war and showed you the path to permanent peace, now it's up to yourselves to fix it for good. However, tracing the path is not nearly the same as walking it. Xhaferi's rise to the minister's office is a consequence of complex and sometimes even paradoxical political processes in the circumstances of strong nationalist sentiment on behalf of both ethnic groups. The Republic of Macedonia's government is formed by the DUI as representatives of the Albanian factor, and VMRO-DPMNE, which since 2006 is winning the largest portion of the ethnic Macedonian votes. Both parties are strongly oriented towards their own ethnic group, with nationalist logic and rhetoric (an example being the status on DUI's Facebook page) a crucial part of their modus operandi, therefore rendering their coalition a marriage of interest more than anything else. With Macedonia locked in a complex name dispute with neighboring Greece that blocks European integration processes, populism has become the winning formula.
It is in this context that Xhaferi became a minister of Defence. It is an unwritten rule that the winners of majority votes in the elections from the Macedonian and Albanian sector form the government, but what happens when they are ideologically incompatible? Political intrigues and poor decisions that only serve to aggravate nationalistic reaction on both sides. In this case, it was manifested vehemently through violence on the streets. Shortly after Xhaferi was nominated, Macedonian demonstrators clashed with the police in the Macedonian capital, Skopje. The protesters, many of whom were young people, were also using anti-Albanian chants and physically assaulted random Albanians on the streets. This was used as a pretext for an Albanian counter-protest the next day, which according to Reuters left around 20 people injured and a dozen arrested, with the mob running riot in the city centre, destroying shops and even torching a bus.
Fast forward to a month later. The Macedonian side did their best to diffuse the situation - by adding fuel to the fire. Johan Tarculovski, a commander of the Macedonian special police forces, tried and convicted at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for atrocities committed during in the village of Ljuboten in 2001, was given a hero's welcome by the Prime minister Nikola Gruevski and hailed as a protector of the country. The government-sponsored parade was deemed distasteful, and unsurprisingly hasn't made the country's ethnic Albanians too happy, but it was seen as a damage-control response by the Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE for the Xhaferi concession, to appease its own voters. What it actually achieved is to further enhance the process of ethnic polarization; by celebrating a convicted war criminal, it directly contradicted post-2001 reconciliation efforts.
Artan Sadiku, a researcher at the Skopje Institute of Social Sciences, is convinced that the ruling coalition is to blame: “It is the political elite of this country. They have been governing and running this country through exploiting sometimes even extremely ultra-nationalistic discourse and rhetoric, just to maintain power,” he stated. Naser Selmani, Head of the Macedonian Association of Journalists, goes one step further: “I'll be honest, all those recent incidents were organized by the political parties in power. Why are they doing this? I strongly believe that there is still a strong motivation to break up Macedonia.”
It's a strong claim no doubt, borderline conspiracy, but in fact, it is a sign of desperation. Many of the opponents of the government's bizarre policies, who are seeking real reconciliation and functioning democracy, feel powerless in the context of a rising nationalist tide that divides the two ethnic groups further and further. The EU, USA and NATO, guided by their principles of respect for sovereignty, are reluctant to interfere in the internal matters of the country, despite its obvious deficiencies, unless there is the imminent threat of war, like in 2001. However, many predict that this instability will eventually lead exactly to that, and point the finger at European passivity and lack of support for the progressive elements in society. Bogdanka Kuzeska, chief editor in the national TV station 24 Vesti (24 News) asserts: “It seems the West is content with just overseeing the ceasefire of 2001, and for the next stage, there isn't too much concern. Thirteen years after the conflict, it seems the international community cares more about form than content.”
Meanwhile, the lack of accountability of the ruling political parties allows them to tolerate the emergence of public hate speech by extremists on both sides, as long as it suits their interests. This has directly contributed to a sharp increase of inter-ethnic violence. Kuzeska blames the local but also to the international political actors: “It is obvious that politicians haven't shown willingness to calm the situation. The Prime Minister Gruevski hasn't made a single public statement, and there is silence by the ruling Albanian party as well. But also, no EU country with diplomatic representation in Macedonia hasn't shown serious public concerns over the violence.”
What can the West do? Introducing the ‘name dilemma’
And violence there is plenty. According to the Helsinki Human Rights Committee, in the period from January to December 2013 there have been 116 hate-motivated crimes, and 170 from February to May 2014, of which 97 were due to ethnic intolerance between the Macedonians and Albanians. The Committee considers this trend extremely worrying, as the state and the parties don't take any measure to prevent it. “We still haven't seen representatives of the biggest political parties to stand side by side and call for calming of the situation,” says Voislav Stojanovski, a legal advisor in the Committee. Every time an 'ethnic' incident happens, the fear of violence spiraling out of control – and into war – lingers once again: an illustration of just how fragile the situation is.
But what can the international factor realistically do about it? Whatever the opinion about the ruling elite, they are still legitimate representatives of the people's will. The impression in the West is that its options are exhausted and that it can't force somebody to improve their democratic capacity, so an imperfect situation is acceptable as long as there is no war. But being a part of Macedonian society, one can sense the insecurity in its citizens who have already seen once how quickly things can turn ugly. The disillusionment with the European Union can also be sensed due to this perceived indifference by the international community. These sentiments create fertile ground for the euro-skepticism that usually goes hand in hand with nationalism in the rightist agenda. If Europe has abandoned us, Macedonian people argue, then we can rely only on ourselves to protect our interests.
Another thing that reinforces euro-skepticism and nationalistic entrenchment is the issue that dominates media discourse in Macedonia and eclipses every other problem: the name dispute with Greece. The neighboring country objects to the use of the name Macedonia, considering it a part of its historical heritage, and it has an upper hand in the battle over the past due to its position in the present, as an influential EU and NATO state. Contrary to Western common knowledge, the dispute isn't merely a tedious diplomatic argument over the nationality of Alexander the Great. It also has serious impact on the internal reality in Macedonia. As a means to put pressure on its neighbor, Greece blocks the road to ascension in EU and NATO, which only intensifies the ethnic tensions in Macedonia, as its citizens react to the uncertain perspective of the country with divisions along ethnic lines over the necessary course of action, and increased hostility towards one another.
Yet, as the saying goes, wherever there is crisis, there is an opportunity. Biljana Vankovska, a political scientist at Skopje University, admits that “the distrust between the communities is growing,” before adding, “I don't see any glue to bring them together, except for the NATO and EU.” Unlocking Macedonia's EU ascension process for the international community could be a way of preventing a further deterioration of ethnic relations, without having to employ too many resources towards stabilizing the country. It would be a constructive move to relieve the Albanians' unrest of falling behind their compatriots in the region in the integration processes, and it would reaffirm the aspiration of Macedonians to be a part of the European family, countering the current development of negative attitude towards the European Union. Bogdanka Kuzevska is confident that opening the window for integration will calm the ethnic tensions: “No matter which ethnic group people belong to, they have the same objective, which is the EU. The West can facilitate the progress of negotiations with Greece, by directly speaking with their government. Look at the example of Serbia and Kosovo – they reached an agreement after intensive mediation by the EU, after which Serbia got a date for starting membership negotiations.”
Greece's stance has so far proven to be an insurmountable obstacle, but the growing threat of collapse of ethnic relations in Macedonia may force the EU's hand into playing the card intended for use only at the darkest hour. In 2001, the international community implied that Macedonia's European integration would be contingent on the implementation of the Ohrid agreement that ended the conflict. Today, it seems the order should have been reverse: Macedonia needs to be on the way to the EU in order for the reconciliation project to be successful.
What can Macedonia do?
Although the West needs to show greater engagement, in the end, Macedonia's undoing is its own work. “We sweep the problems under the carpet. Its sad that after 23 years of independence as a democratic state, we are pointing the finger at the West,” admits Kuzeska. Xhaferi never expressed any regret about the inflammatory Facebook status, because these kinds of hypocritical machinations have become a regular part of political discourse by the ruling parties. As Kuzeska says, both parties complain about each other, yet they have ruled together for six years, and when the time to form a government comes, political calculations overshadow the long-term benefit of the country. And that is not helping the inter-ethnic relations. The politicians are playing a dangerous game by manipulating nationalistic emotion to mobilize voters and remain in power, but the risk of losing control of this emotion can be devastating for the future of the country. Real effort instead of formal declarations is needed to fix the bad blood between the Macedonians and Albanians.
But Macedonia is a part of Europe. The EU and the international community can't afford to ignore the situation and wait for a repeat of 2001. If they learned their lesson from the Yugoslav bloodshed, they should know that it's better to prevent than to treat. Now they have the means to do so; speeding up the EU integration process by putting pressure on Greece. Otherwise, all of its efforts in 2001 will be in vain. As the saying goes that exists both in the West and in Macedonia, don't start what you can't finish.
Ivo Bosilkov is a media researcher and independent analyst. He is a former journalist on Macedonian national TV Kanal 5, covering topics ranging from foreign politics to sport.
